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ESSAY 
AN ESSAY ON THE QUIETING OF PRODUCTS 
LIABILITY LAW 
Aaron D. Twerski† 
For several decades, courts and commentators have 
disagreed as to whether the standard for liability in product 
design defect cases should be based on risk-utility tradeoffs 
or disappointed consumer expectations. Although a strong 
majority opt for risk-utility a significant minority of courts 
adopt the consumer expectations test. This Essay contends 
that as a practical matter in jurisdictions that allow for 
recovery in design defect cases on a consumer expectations 
theory, plaintiffs introduce a reasonable alternative design as 
the predicate for recovery. In fifteen of the seventeen states 
that allow recovery based on consumer expectations the 
author could not find a single case in which the plaintiff did 
not introduce a reasonable alternative design. And in all 
jurisdictions but one, a defendant is free to introduce risk-
utility evidence as relevant to the issue of whether the 
product disappoints consumer expectations. Thus, whether a 
reasonable alternative design is required de jure, it is de facto 
a staple in almost all design defect cases. 
INTRODUCTION 
Almost six decades have passed since the onset of the 
modern products liability era.1  The tumult that followed the 
adoption by the American Law Institute of strict liability in 
 
 † Irwin & Jill Cohen Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School, Special Counsel 
to Herzfeld and Rubin, P.C.  The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of 
the law school librarian, Kathleen Darvil, to this project and to that of Carolyn 
Morway (Brooklyn Law School 2019). 
 1 The case that abolished the requirement of privity for strict liability against 
a manufacturer, Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960),  
written in the same year as William L. Prosser’s classic article, The Assault Upon 
the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960), ushered in 
the new era of products liability.  Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A was 
adopted by the American Law Institute in 1963 and quickly was adopted by 
almost all jurisdictions. 
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Section 402A is long behind us.2  The rules governing such 
issues as crashworthiness,3 liability for products with patent 
dangers,4 comparative fault,5 and responsibility of component 
part manufacturers have been settled.6  Much of the hullabaloo 
surrounding the Products Liability Restatement in 1998 has 
faded into the past.  The torrent of scholarly literature dealing 
with products liability has been reduced to a trickle.7  But one 
area of the law still seems to attract the interest of the courts: 
the controversy as to whether liability for defective product 
design should be governed by risk-utility balancing or the 
consumer expectation test.  In the past several years courts in 
 
 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
 3 In the early years following the adoption of Section 402A, there was 
controversy as to whether an automobile manufacturer had a duty to design a 
car so as to minimize damages to a passenger in case of an accident.  See Evans 
v. General Motors, Corp., 359 F.2d 822, 825 (7th Cir. 1986) (applying Indiana 
law and denying liability for crashworthiness), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 836, 836 
(1966), overruled by Huff v. White Motor Corp., 565 F.2d 104, 109 (7th Cir. 1977); 
Larsen v. General Motors, Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 502 (8th Cir. 1968) (applying 
Minnesota law and recognizing a cause of action for crashworthiness).  The action 
for crashworthiness is now universally accepted. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: 
PRODS. LIAB. § 16(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1998) [hereinafter PRODS. LIAB. RESTATEMENT]. 
See DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW § 17.3, at 1065 (3d ed. 2015) (“. . . 
[I]t seems safe to say that the crashworthiness doctrine is now the law in every 
American jurisdiction.”). 
 4 The “patent danger rule” immunized manufacturers from design liability 
when the product’s danger was open and obvious.  See, e.g., Campo v. Scofield, 
95 N.E.2d 802, 804 (N.Y. 1950) (concluding that the defendants are not liable for 
the plaintiff’s injury because the danger of the machine manufactured by 
defendants is open and obvious), overruled by Micallef v. Miehle Co., Div. of 
Miehle-Goss Dexter, 348 N.E.2d 571, 573 (N.Y. 1976).  The Products Liability 
Restatement § 2, Comments d and g reject the patent danger rule as an absolute 
defense in design defect cases; obviousness of danger is one factor in deciding 
whether a product should have been made safer.  See OWEN, supra note 3, § 10.2, 
at 610 (virtually all American jurisdictions today, while refusing to apply a patent 
danger rule to design defect cases, boldly and properly apply it to “warning 
claims”) and cases cited in PRODS. LIAB. RESTATEMENT § 2, Reporter’s Notes at p. 
85. 
 5 PRODS. LIAB. RESTATEMENT § 17(a), § 1 cmt. b; see also Webb v. Navistar 
Int’l Transp. Corp., 692 A.2d 343, 346−350 (Vt. 1996) (discussing the policy 
reasons to apply comparative fault to products liability cases). 
 6 PRODS. LIAB. RESTATEMENT § 5; see also Zaza v. Marquess & Nell, Inc., 675 
A.2d 620, 629 (N.J. 1996) (discussing the majority rule that component part 
manufacturers are generally immune from liability when their non-defective parts 
are integrated into a larger product). 
 7 For the years 1963–1968, the Index to Legal Periodicals showed 1,602 
articles under the category of Products Liability.  In the years 2012–2018, there 
were only 272 academic journal articles under this category. 
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Pennsylvania,8 Connecticut,9 Nevada,10 and Florida11 have 
written lengthy opinions on the issue.  The question as to 
whether to make out a credible design claim the plaintiff must 
prove a reasonable alternative design (RAD) lies at the heart of 
the debate.12 
In Part I, this Essay will very briefly review the origins of 
the controversy.  Part II will argue that the controversy has 
been basically settled by the litigants who almost invariably 
fashion design litigation with regard to the viability of a RAD.  
Courts may not require a RAD but one has to look long and 
hard to find cases where a RAD has not been introduced.  Jury 
instructions may talk consumer expectations, but the focus of 
the case is RAD.  Part III will explain why plaintiffs opt to 
introduce evidence of a RAD in consumer expectations states. 
Part IV will survey the seventeen states that allow the recovery 
based on the consumer expectation test and show that in 
fifteen of the seventeen there are no design cases where a RAD 
was not introduced.13  Part V will discuss the two consumer 
 
 8 Tincher v. Omega Flex, Inc., 104 A.3d 328, 368 (Pa. 2016), vacated and 
remanded for new trial sub nom., 180 A.3d 386 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2018).  For a more 
extensive analysis of Tincher, see infra note 62. 
 9 Bifolck v. Philip Morris, Inc., 152 A.3d 1183, 1203 (Conn. 2016).  For a 
more extensive analysis of Bifolck, see infra note 59. 
 10 Ford Motor Co. v. Trejo, 402 P.3d 649, 654–58 (Nev. 2017).  For a more 
extensive analysis of Trejo, see infra note 55. 
 11 Aubin v. Union Carbide Corp., 177 So. 3d 489, 510–12 (Fla. 2015). 
 12 See, e.g., id. at 505 (stating the critical difference between Second 
Restatement and the Third Restatement is the requirement that the plaintiff 
demonstrates the existence of a “reasonable alternative design”); Tincher, 104 
A.3d at 395 (“[A] product may be in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous 
to the user even though no feasible alternative design is available.”) (citation 
omitted). 
 13 Four states who by statute have adopted the consumer expectation test 
either by statute or judicial decision are, in reality, risk-utility states.  Arkansas, 
Indiana, and Utah are prime examples.  For a comprehensive discussion of the 
law in these states, see Aaron D. Twerski & James A. Henderson, Jr., 
Manufacturers’ Liability for Defective Product Designs: The Triumph of Risk-Utility, 
74 BROOK. L. REV. 1061, at 1081 n.99, 1089 n.113, 1091 nn.122–25 (2009) 
[hereinafter, Twerski & Henderson, Jr., The Triumph of Risk-Utility] (outlining the 
laws in Indiana, Arkansas, and Utah).  In Evans v. Nacco Materials Handling 
Grp., Inc., 810 S.E.2d 462, 470 (Va. 2018), the court said that liability for 
defective design could be established by showing that the product did not meet 
what reasonable consumers consider defective.  But the court said: 
Thus, while the jury could have concluded from the evidence that 
the plaintiff’s proposed redesign would eliminate, or at least 
reduce, the likelihood that the type of accident at issue in this case 
would occur, there was no evidence from which the jury could 
conclude that the plaintiff’s proposed redesign is safer overall. . . .   
It may also be true, however, that operators and bystanders would 
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expectation states in which there were design cases and no 
RAD was introduced.  It will also critique the view of one of the 
states that will not allow risk-utility into evidence as relevant 
to whether a product meets consumer expectations.  However, 
the main focus of this Essay is to tell the story as to how 
products liability law has become non-controversial. It has 
settled down because plaintiffs have decided for good and 
sufficient reason to try design cases on the premise that the 
availability of a RAD is crucial to a credible case. 
I 
THE ORIGINS OF THE CONSUMER EXPECTATION TEST 
The consumer expectation test had its origins in two 
comments to Section 402A that provide for liability to accrue: 
a product must be in a defective condition unreasonably 
dangerous to the user or consumer.  Comment g defines 
“defective condition”: 
The rule stated in this Section applies only where the 
product is, at the time it leaves the seller’s hands, in a 
condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, 
which will be unreasonably dangerous to him. 
Comment i defines “unreasonably dangerous”: 
The article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that 
which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer 
who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to 
the community as to its characteristics. 
The leading scholars writing on or about the time that          
Section 402A was adopted did not envisage these comments as 
relevant to design defect.  Dean William Prosser writing in 1971 
said: 
There are . . . two particular areas in which the liability of 
the manufacturer, even though it may occasionally be called 
strict, appears to rest primarily upon a departure from 
proper standards of care, so that the tort is essentially a 
 
face a greater risk of injury under the plaintiff’s redesign than 
exists under the current design.  Thus, even if [the] plaintiff had 
proved that reasonable consumers expected a design that limits 
brake adjustment to a mechanic, or that makes it more difficult to 
adjust the brake by requiring the use of tools, there was no 
evidentiary basis for a jury to conclude that [the] plaintiff’s proposed 
redesign was safer overall. 
Id. at 472 (second emphasis added). 
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matter of negligence.14 
Prosser then goes on at length to describe design defect and 
failure to warn as based in negligence.15  Over the next decade 
this theme was echoed by such scholars as Dean Page 
Keeton,16 Professors Gary Schwartz,17 John Wade,18 Mary J. 
Davis,19 Sheila Birnbaum,20 and William C. Powers.21  As late 
as 1984, the Prosser and Keeton Hornbook on the Law of Torts 
made it clear that the consumer expectation test was 
inappropriate as a test for design defect.22  To be sure, there 
were dissenters23 but the consensus was that the consumer 
expectation test would fade into oblivion.24 
It did not happen.  A cadre of courts insisted that they 
wanted to retain the consumer expectation test since, unlike a 
risk-utility test, which smacked of negligence, it was a true 
strict liability test.  The critics notwithstanding, the consumer 
expectation test continues to live on in about seventeen 
 
 14 WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 96, at 644 (4th ed. 1971) (footnote 
omitted). 
 15 Id. at 645–48. 
 16 W. Page Keeton, Products Liability—Design Hazards and the Meaning of 
Defect, 10 CUMB. L. REV. 293, 310 (1979). 
 17 Gary T. Schwartz, Foreword: Understanding Products Liability, 67 CALIF. L. 
REV. 435, 476, n.241 (1979). 
 18 John W. Wade, On Product “Design Defects” and their Actionability, 33 
VAND. L. REV. 551, 566–67 (1980). 
 19 Mary J. Davis, Design Defect Liability: In Search of a Standard of 
Responsibility, 39 WAYNE L. REV. 1217, 1236–37 (1993). 
 20 Sheila L. Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence 
[to Warranty] to Strict liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REV. 593, 613–14 (1980). 
 21 William Powers, Jr., A Modest Proposal to Abandon Strict Products Liability, 
1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 639, 665−68 (1991). 
 22 PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 99, at 698–99 (W. Page Keeton, et al., 5th 
ed. 1984).  But see Michael D. Green, The Unappreciated Congruity of the Second 
and Third Torts Restatements on Design Defects, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 807, 837 
(2009).  Professor Green argues that both the Second and Third Restatements 
recognize a strict liability consumer expectation test for products that do not meet 
minimum standards of safety.  Sec. 3 of the Products Liability Restatement 
embodies that principle.  This author is in agreement.  See infra note 30.  In 
short, when a product fails to perform its manifestly intended function it does 
not matter whether the failure results from a manufacturing defect or a design 
defect.  Risk-utility and RAD are important when the claim is that a product 
should have been designed with greater safety. 
 23 See, e.g., Marshall S. Shapo, In Search of the Law of Products Liability: The 
ALI Restatement Project, 48 VAND. L. REV. 631, 644 (1995) (explaining the 
importance of consumer expectations to design defect claims and arguing that 
courts should at least consider these expectations alongside risk-utility). 
 24 OWEN, supra note 3, § 8.4, at 490–91. 
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jurisdictions.25  In a few states it is the only test for defect;26 in 
a greater number it is an alternate test for defect, i.e., risk- 
utility or consumer expectation.27  The cases agree, in 
principle, that the consumer expectation test is limited to 
“cases in which the everyday experience of the product’s users 
permits a conclusion that the product’s design violated 
minimum safety assumptions . . . .”28 
II 
IF NOT DE JURE—RAD IS DE FACTO NECESSARY TO MAKE OUT A 
CREDIBLE DESIGN CLAIM 
It is not the intent of this Essay to rehash the debate about 
risk-utility versus consumer expectations.  My longtime 
collaborator and co-reporter of the Products Liability 
Restatement, Professor James A. Henderson, Jr. and this 
author have written at length on this issue.29  Our position is 
that to make out a classic design defect case, a plaintiff must 
prove that a RAD was available at the time of sale.30  The 
 
 25 See infra notes 44–48, 51–58 (providing examples of jurisdictions that 
continue to apply the consumer expectation test). 
 26 These include Kansas, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Maryland, and Nevada.  See 
infra notes 51–55. 
 27 These include Alaska, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, 
Illinois, Pennsylvania, New York, Oregon, Tennessee, and Washington.  See infra 
notes 57–67. 
 28 Soule v. Gen. Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 308 (Cal. 1994). 
 29 See, e.g., Aaron D. Twerski, From Risk-Utility to Consumer Expectations: 
Enhancing the Role of Judicial Screening in Product Liability Litigation, 11 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 861, 892−935 (1983) (arguing that a consumer expectation test for design 
defect, if limited to the failure of the product for core uses, is similar to res ipsa 
and provides a legitimate ground for recovery); James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron 
D. Twerski, A Proposed Revision of Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1512, 1514 (1992) (proposing revisions to section 402A 
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts that prefer risk-utility calculus in design 
defect claims); James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Achieving Consensus 
on Defective Product Design, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 867, 879–87 (1998) (discussing 
the shortcomings of the consumer expectation test, and asserting that the risk-
utility standard, when accompanied by a reasonable alternative design, is the 
superior standard); Twerski & Henderson, Jr., The Triumph of Risk-Utility, supra 
note 13, at 1106–08 (asserting that the risk-utility test continues to be superior 
to the consumer expectation test in all but res ipsa disputes).  The Products 
Liability Restatement reflects the views of both Professor Henderson and this 
author inasmuch as we served as co-reporters on this project. 
 30 See supra note 29.  We have throughout noted that a RAD is not required 
in res ipsa like cases.  See Products Liability Restatement § 3 that allows an 
inference of defect “without proof of a specific defect, when the incident that 
harmed the plaintiff . . . was of a kind that ordinarily occurs as a result of product 
defect[. . . .]” (emphasis added).  Although this inference of defect is most 
frequently applied in manufacturing defect cases, § 3 cmt. b provides that 
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inquiry of this Essay is whether evidence of a RAD is routinely 
offered by plaintiffs in states that allow a plaintiff to proceed 
under the consumer expectation test.  With very few 
exceptions, the author found that—regardless of the theory 
that a state follows—the plaintiff almost invariably introduces 
a RAD into evidence.31  It is rare to find a design case where 
the plaintiff did not do so.  There are a few isolated examples, 
but the issue of whether a plaintiff must introduce a RAD is 
almost beside the point.  If a RAD is not required de jure, it is 
de facto a staple in almost all design cases. 
To arrive at this conclusion, the author searched all state 
cases reported under the West Key Number collecting reported 
product liability design defect cases.32  The search did not 
include federal diversity cases.  In our 2009 article surveying 
the states that had required a RAD, we counted twenty five 
states that had adopted RAD as mandatory to establishing a 
prima facie design defect case.33  They were obviously not the 
focus of this inquiry.  Instead, the author identified states that 
either had committed to the consumer expectation test as the 
exclusive test for design defect or had adopted the two-prong 
test.  Since a plaintiff had the option of proceeding under the 
consumer expectation test, it was of interest to see whether the 
plaintiff sought to introduce evidence of a RAD and whether 
courts allowed the factfinder to consider this evidence. 
The author makes no claim to have reviewed every state 
design case.  To limit the inquiry the search depended on the 
 
“occasionally a product design causes the product to malfunction in a manner 
identical to that which would ordinarily be caused by a manufacturing defect.”  
The comment goes on to limit liability to situations in which a product fails to 
perform its manifestly intended function.  See, e.g., id. at illus. 1−4 (providing 
hypotheticals that demonstrate situations in which products failed to perform 
their manifestly intended function, versus situations in which they did not). 
Courts that have adopted the consumer expectations test have also realized the 
necessity of placing sensible limits on its applicability.  See Soule, 882 P.2d at 
308–10 (holding that the consumer expectation test must not allow a jury to 
ignore risk-utility analysis, nor may it result in a verdict that is unsupported as 
a matter of law); Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 662 N.E.2d 730, 743–44 (N.Y. 1995) 
(discussing the utility of the consumer expectation test in considering RAD, but 
noting a preference for risk-utility). 
 31 See infra Part IV. 
 32 The West Key Number is 313A k126. 
 33 Twerski & Henderson, Jr., The Triumph of Risk-Utility, supra note 13, at 
1080.  Wisconsin, originally classified as a consumer expectations state, has now 
adopted a RAD test for design conflict cases as set forth in Products Liability 
Restatement § 2(b).  See infra note 56 (detailing Wisconsin’s adoption of a RAD 
requirement). 
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West classification in its key numbers.  And, as noted earlier, 
federal diversity cases were not analyzed.  Nor did the author 
provide elaborate citation to the cases in which the plaintiffs 
introduced a RAD.  Having identified the states covered in this 
research, the notes in the margin will simply state that having 
read the cases in consumer expectation states none were found 
that in which a RAD was not introduced.  The author invites 
any reader to check the research and confirm the veracity of 
my claim.  One important caveat must be noted: in cases where 
defect is derived from the application of res ipsa, a RAD is not 
presented.  Almost always these are manufacturing defect 
cases for which no RAD need be established.34  Occasionally, 
design language appears in the case and the West Key 
Numbers may have included such a case.  Cases alleging defect 
in drug design cases are also omitted.  These are not classic 
design cases and are irrelevant to this survey.35 
III 
WHY IS EVIDENCE OF RAD ALMOST ALWAYS INTRODUCED IN 
CONSUMER EXPECTATION STATES 
Why would a plaintiff, in states that provide the option of 
proving a design defect by alleging a plaintiff friendly consumer 
expectation test, take the trouble to engage expensive experts 
to demonstrate to the jury that an alternative design would 
have been safer?  Four significant reasons support the 
ubiquitous presence of a RAD in design litigation: 
(1) The consumer expectation test is vague and         
non-specific.  A RAD points to a specific element of 
the design and seeks to convince the jury that had 
 
 34 See, e.g., J.M.F. Trucking, Inc. v. Carburetor & Elec. of Lewiston, Inc., 748 
P.2d 381, 390−91 (Idaho 1987) (requiring no RAD where a truck engine caught 
fire and the plaintiff relied on a res ipsa theory of recovery); Pagnotta v. Beall 
Trailers of Oregon, Inc., 991 P.2d 728, 732–33 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (requiring 
no RAD where a truck trailer detached from a truck and the plaintiff relied on a 
consumer expectation/res ipsa theory of recovery). 
 35 The standard for liability in drug design cases has been the subject of great 
controversy.  Courts have articulated eight different tests for drug design liability. 
See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Drug Design Liability: Farewell 
to Comment k, 67 BAYLOR L. REV. 521, 542–43 (2015).  Furthermore, there is 
almost unanimous agreement that courts are institutionally incapable of 
administering a RAD test for drugs.  Id. at 544–48; see also Lance v. Wyeth, 85 
A.3d 434, 443 (Pa. 2014) (echoing the sentiment that the proposition of a RAD is 
not feasible in drug cases).  For an article suggesting that drug design claims are 
now subject to federal preemption, see Aaron D. Twerski, The Demise of Drug 
Design Litigation: Death by Federal Preemption, 68 AM. U. L. REV. 281, 303–04 
(2018). 
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that feature been incorporated into the design of the 
product the plaintiff would not have, for example, 
suffered the loss of a hand or would not be a 
quadriplegic.  This is a far more compelling story 
than “my expectations of product performance were 
disappointed.”  The consumer expectation test is 
bland; the availability of a RAD is vibrant. 
(2) RAD being a negligence concept points the finger at 
the defendant and says that for a minimum outlay 
of funds the defendant could have saved the client 
from serious injury.  In most jurisdictions, recovery 
for pain and suffering is open-ended.36  The greater 
the fault the greater the likelihood the jury will 
impose significant damages.37  The consumer 
expectations test is fault neutral.  It speaks not to 
the defendant’s conduct or product but to the 
plaintiff’s expectations. 
(3) In preparing for trial, plaintiff’s counsel cannot be 
sure that the product design is so clearly defective 
that it fails to meet a consumer’s minimum 
expectations as to safety.  Plaintiffs must be 
prepared for the very real possibility that a court will 
deny them a “consumer expectations” instruction 
after the completion of the case.38 
(4) As courts have noted, consumers have a right to 
 
 36 See DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, HORNBOOK ON 
TORTS 855 (2d ed. 2015) (explaining that “[a]wards for pain are not easy to 
evaluate because there is no objective criterion for judgment”). 
 37 See Richard L. Cupp, Jr. & Danielle Polage, The Rhetoric of Strict Products 
Liability Versus Negligence: An Empirical Analysis, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 874, 874 
(2002).  The authors conclude that use of negligence terminology rather than 
strict liability was more likely to result in jurors’ willingness to award any 
damages; when awards of damages were made, they were greater when 
negligence was the theory presented to them.  Thus, a negligence instruction may 
improve the plaintiff’s chances both in terms of imposing liability and receiving a 
higher damages award.  See also Paul D. Rheingold, The Expanding Liability of 
the Product Supplier: A Primer, 2 HOFSTRA L. REV. 521, 531 (1974), which notes 
that “[m]ore plaintiffs would prefer to present their respective cases to a jury on 
a negligence, rather than a strict liability, basis. In McLuenesque terms 
negligence is ‘hot’ and strict liability is ‘cold.’ It is easier to prevail by showing 
that the defendant did something wrong than that there is something technically 
defective about the product.”  
 38 See, e.g., Soule v. Gen. Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 310 (Cal. 1994) 
(reasoning that in some cases the consumer expectation test was unworkable as 
a stand-alone theory of liability); Lamke v. Futorian Corp., 709 P.2d 684, 686 
(Okla. 1985) (holding that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate a sufficiently 
defective design such that a reasonable consumer would expect alternative 
outcomes). 
TWERSKI ESSAY FORMATTED  
110 CORNELL LAW REVIEW  [Vol.105:PPP 
 
expect well-designed products.39  Thus the 
availability of a RAD gives support to the claim that 
the product disappoints legitimate expectations of 
the consumer.  This argument appears to be 
duplicitous since the test for whether a RAD should 
have been adopted is viewed from the perspective of 
the hypothetical reasonable person not the 
reasonable manufacturer.  Nonetheless, the desire 
to assure that juries keep the perspective of the 
reasonable consumer in mind in deciding whether a 
RAD should have been adopted is not without 
merit.40 
Given the ubiquitous presence of RAD evidence in design 
defect cases in almost all jurisdictions regardless of whether 
they require a RAD or not, the question arises as to whether 
the role of RAD is discussed in jury instructions.  In consumer 
expectation states, are jurors told about RAD or risk-utility 
balancing?  Defendants regularly ask for instructions that 
focus the jury on risk-utility, and in “consumer expectation” 
states they are denied.41  How significant is the lack of 
instruction on risk-utility?  It is the author’s surmise that lack 
of instruction to the jury is of, some, but not monumental 
significance.  Once the plaintiff has introduced a RAD into 
evidence based on the plaintiff’s expert’s testimony as to its 
practical feasibility and the defendant has countered with its 
experts, the jury’s attention is directed to whether the product 
under scrutiny was reasonably safe.  It is the proverbial 
“elephant in the room.”  An interesting example of this 
phenomenon arose in Soule v. General Motors Corp.42  In that 
 
 39 See, e.g., Aubin v. Union Carbide Corp., 177 So.3d 489, 511 (Fla. 2015) 
(emphasizing the manufacturer’s power to direct consumer expectation through 
product portrayal and advertising, and reasoning that this power may justify a 
greater duty to meet consumer expectations); Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 435 P.2d 
806, 808 (Or. 1967) (en banc) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 395 cmt. 
f, 402A) (“The user has the right to expect a reasonably safe design and 
reasonable quality controls in fabrication according to that design.”); Tincher v. 
Omega Flex, Inc., 104 A.3d 328, 402–03 (Pa. 2016) (noting that consumers have 
a right to expect products that are safe for normal use); Hamilton v. Motor Coach 
Indus., Inc., 569 S.W.2d 571, 577 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978) (“The consumer has a 
right to expect that he will receive from the manufacturer a product that is safe.”). 
 40 OWEN, supra note 3, at 512; Seattle-First Nat’l Bank v. Tabert, 542 P.2d 
774, 774–79 (Wash. 1975). 
 41 See, e.g., Lester v. Magic Chef, Inc., 641 P.2d 353, 361 (Kan. 1982) 
(denying the plaintiff’s request for a risk-utility jury instruction in Kansas); Ford 
Motor Co. v. Trejo, 402 P.3d 649, 652 (Nev. 2017) (denying the plaintiff’s request 
for risk-utility jury instruction in Nevada). 
 42 See Soule, 882 P.2d at 298. 
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case, the plaintiff suffered serious injury to her ankle when her 
GM Camaro was struck by another car at closing speed on 
impact from 30 to 70 miles per hour.43  The plaintiff alleged 
defective design of the toe pan as the cause of her injuries and 
introduced expert testimony in support of her claim.  GM’s 
experts disputed the claim of design defect.44  The trial judge 
gave a consumer expectations instruction.45  The jury awarded 
$1.65 million in damages.46  On appeal the California Supreme 
Court held that it was error to give a consumer expectations 
instruction because “[a]n ordinary consumer of automobiles 
cannot reasonably expect that a car’s frame, suspension, or 
interior will be designed to remain intact in any and all 
accidents.”47  Nonetheless, the court found that it was 
harmless error to give the consumer expectation instruction 
because almost all the evidence focused on the differing expert 
evaluations of “the strengths, shortcomings, risks, and 
benefits of the challenged design, as compared with a 
competitor’s approach.”48 
Furthermore, the defendant is free to argue the safety or 
lack thereof of the alternative design.  If the RAD is admitted 
into evidence, the defendant must be free to challenge the RAD 
and to argue that the challenged design is safer than the 
alternative or that it would not be economically feasible to 
adopt it.49  Thus, the argument noted earlier that consumers 
expect well-designed products makes comment by counsel 
relevant even in a consumer expectation state.  Very simply, 
once risk-utility considerations are admitted into evidence the 
likelihood that a consumer expectation instruction will have a 
significant impact on the result is, in the author’s opinion, not 
great.  To be sure, when plaintiffs are denied the consumer 
expectations instruction they seek reversal.50  The consumer 
expectations instruction frees the plaintiff from bearing the 
burden of proof on the risk-utility issue and is thus more 
 
 43 Id. at 301. 
 44 Id. at 302. 
 45 Id. at 303. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. at 310. 
 48 Id. at 311. 
 49 See Aubin v. Union Carbide Corp., 177 So. 3d 489, 511 (Fla. 2015). 
 50 See, e.g., McCabe v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 123 Cal. Rptr. 2d 303, 308–09 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (appealing the trial court’s ruling that the customer 
expectation test for defective design was inapplicable to the circumstances in the 
case). 
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favorable to her.  Nonetheless, the defendant is certain to argue 
risk-utility to the jury and the case is likely to be decided on 
those grounds. 
IV 
CONSUMER EXPECTATIONS AND THE UBIQUITOUS RAD IN 
EVIDENCE 
Five states defined defect based solely on the consumer 
expectations test: Kansas,51 Nebraska,52 Oklahoma,53 
 
 51 The seminal cases adopting the consumer expectations test in Kansas are 
Lester v. Magic Chef, Inc., 641 P.2d 353, 361 (Kan. 1982) and Barnes v. Vega 
Indus. 676 P.2d 761, 764 (Kan. 1984).  In both cases, the Kansas Supreme Court 
held that a jury should be instructed on consumer expectations alone.  In both, 
plaintiffs introduced a RAD.  In Delaney v. Deere & Co., 999 P.2d 930, 940 (Kan. 
2000), in answering a certified question from the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
1999 WL 458626 (10th Cir. Jan. 19, 1999), the court reiterated that Kansas was 
committed to the consumer expectation test, but said, “we also recognize the 
validity of risk/utility analysis as a guide in determining the expectations of 
consumers in complex cases.”  Delaney, 999 P.2d at 944.  The court further said 
it would allow “evidence of the feasibility of an alternative design in the trial of a 
design defect.”  Id. at 945.  In reviewing all reported state design defect cases, the 
author found none in which the plaintiff failed to introduce a RAD into evidence. 
 52 Nebraska adopted the consumer expectation test in Rahmig v. Mosley 
Mach. Co., 412 N.W.2d 56, 79 (Neb. 1987) and further held that the plaintiff need 
not prove a RAD in order to make out a prima facie case of design defect. In 
reviewing all state design defect cases post-Rahmig, the author has found none 
in which the plaintiff did not introduce a RAD.  Indeed, in Rahmig, the plaintiff 
introduced evidence of a RAD.  Id; see also Pitts v. Genie Indus., Inc., 921 N.W.2d 
597, 607 (Neb. 2019) (RAD offered); Jay v. Moog Auto., Inc., 652 N.W.2d 872, 
879–80 (Neb. 2002) (RAD offered); Kudlacek v. Fiat S.p.A., 509 N.W.2d 603, 612 
(Neb. 1994) (RAD offered). 
 53 Kirkland v. Gen. Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353, 1362 (Okla. 1974), is the 
lead case adopting the consumer expectations test for design defect.  In reviewing 
the Oklahoma design defect cases, in each instance the plaintiff offered a RAD 
that would have avoided the harm.  See, e.g., Attocknie v. Carpenter Mfg., 901 
P.2d 221, 222 (Okla. Civ. App. 1995) (RAD offered); Stewart v. Scott-Kitz Miller 
Co., 626 P.2d 329, 330 (Okla. Civ. App. 1981) (RAD offered).  It is interesting that 
in two cases the defendant was granted summary judgment, even though the 
plaintiff had offered a RAD, because the court found that the product did not 
disappoint consumer expectations.  Woods v. Fruehauf Trailer Corp., 765 P.2d 
770, 774 (Okla. 1988) (RAD offered but was found not to have made a tanker 
more safe under the consumer expectation test than when fire was fed by gasoline 
spill while the plaintiff was filling the tanker); Lamke v. Futorian Corp., 709 P.2d 
684, 686 (Okla. 1985) (fire caused by cigarette where design claim was that 
chemicals were added to make the cigarette burn longer). 
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Maryland,54 Nevada,55 and Wisconsin56 until 2015.  In these 
jurisdictions in each reported state case the plaintiff 
introduced a RAD into evidence and there was no mention in 
the case that the introduction of a RAD was improper.  
 
 54 Maryland adopted the consumer expectation test in Halliday v. Sturm, 
Ruger & Co., 792 A.2d 1145, 1147–48, 1158 (Md. 2002).  In that case, a three-
year-old boy shot himself while playing with his father’s handgun.  The boy’s 
father disregarded virtually every one of the warnings intended to prevent 
children from accessing the gun.  The Plaintiff suggested a host of alternative 
designs that would have reduced the likelihood that a young child could fire the 
gun.  The court embraced the consumer expectation test as a shield against 
liability and absolved the gun manufacturer of liability.  The Maryland case law 
pre-Halliday held that design defect cases were to be decided on risk-utility 
grounds.  In all of the design cases, the plaintiff introduced a RAD.  See, e.g., 
Nissan Motor Co. v. Nave, 740 A.2d 102, 107 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999) (RAD 
offered); Ziegler v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., 539 A.2d 701, 707 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
1988) (RAD offered); Troja v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 488 A.2d 516, 519–20 (Md. 
Ct. Spec. App. 1985) (RAD offered).  There is a paucity of state case law in 
Maryland post-Halliday.  Nonetheless, in all design cases that the author has 
been able to find, plaintiffs introduced a RAD. 
 55 In Ford Motor Co. v. Trejo, 402 P.3d 649, 655 (Nev. 2017), the court 
rejected the defendant’s request for a risk-utility (RAD) jury instruction in a case 
where the issue was the strength of the roof of a SUV in a roll-over situation.  In 
a lengthy opinion, the court held that a RAD was not necessary in a design defect 
case and that Nevada adhered to the consumer expectation test.  Id. at 655–57.  
The court said that the availability of a RAD was one factor to be taken into 
account in deciding whether a product’s design met consumer expectations.  Id. 
at 653–54.  A search of all Nevada design defect cases reveals that in all the cases 
the plaintiff presented evidence of a RAD.  That a RAD is not a formal requisite 
does not alter the fact that plaintiffs deem a RAD necessary to make out a credible 
design defect case.  Indeed, in Trejo, extensive evidence was introduced by both 
parties as to whether a RAD was technologically and economically feasible.  Id. 
at 657–58. 
 56 As of 2011, Wisconsin requires proof of a RAD when a claimant alleges a 
design defect.  WIS. STAT.  § 895.047(1)(a).  Up to that time, Wisconsin adhered 
to the consumer expectation test.  See, e.g., Morden v. Continental AG, 611 
N.W.2d 659, 667 (Wis. 2000) (manufacturer liable for negligent design and RAD 
offered); Giese v. Montgomery Ward, Inc., 331 N.W.2d 585, 588–89  (Wis. 1983) 
(RAD offered); Vincer v. Esther Williams All-Aluminum Swimming Pool Co., 230 
N.W.2d 794, 796, 798 (Wis. 1975) (RAD offered); Arbet v. Gussarson, 225 N.W.2d 
431, 434 (Wis. 1975) (RAD offered); Derby  v. Brenner Tank, Inc., 522 N.W.2d 
274, 275 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994) (RAD offered).  Despite holding that a RAD was not 
required, in Sumnicht v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 360 N.W.2d 2, 18 (Wis. 
1984), the plaintiff introduced a RAD and the court found that evidence 
supported the availability of a RAD.  Similarly, in Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, 
Inc., 629 N.W.2d 727, 733 (Wis. 2001), the plaintiff alleged the presence of high-
protein latex powder in the latex gloves that caused her to suffer a serious allergic 
reaction.  The plaintiff introduced evidence that low-protein latex gloves would 
have been effective without causing allergic reactions.  Id. at 733–34.  Although 
the court held that the consumer expectation instruction was correct, the fact 
remains that the plaintiff introduced evidence of a RAD. Id. at 759.  In short, no 
Wisconsin design defect case from 1975 to present was found in which the 
plaintiff failed to introduce a RAD. 
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Although the cases often say that the plaintiff need not 
introduce a RAD, the trier of fact had before it the RAD.  Twelve 
states allowed the plaintiff to proceed either under the 
consumer expectations test or risk-utility: Alaska,57 Arizona,58 
 
 57 The lead case in Alaska adopting the two-prong test is Caterpillar Tractor 
Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 876 (Alaska 1979) (RAD offered); see also, Gen. Motors 
Corp. v. Farnsworth, 965 P.2d 1209, 1213 (Alaska 1998) (RAD offered); Dura 
Corp. v. Harned, 703 P.2d 396, 401 (Alaska 1985) (RAD offered).  No design case 
was found in which the plaintiff did not introduce a RAD. 
 58 Dart v. Wiebe Mfg., 709 P.2d 876, 878–80 (Ariz. 1985) (en banc) is the 
leading case adopting the two alternative tests for design defect consumer 
expectation and risk-utility.  The court acknowledged that “while the consumer 
expectation test may sometimes work well in design defect cases, it provides no 
resolution for those cases in which ‘the consumer would not know what to expect 
. . . .’”  Id. at 878. (citations omitted).  A review of the cases reveals that in all 
design defect cases plaintiffs introduced a reasonable alternative design.  See, 
e.g., Anderson v. Nissei ASB Mach. Co., 3 P.3d 1088, 1093 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999) 
(RAD offered); Hohlenkamp v. Rheem Mfg. Co, 655 P.2d 32, 34 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1982) (RAD offered).  Although the Arizona courts continually make reference to 
the consumer expectations test as appropriate to some design defect cases, the 
author could find no design defect case in which a RAD was not introduced into 
evidence. 
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Connecticut,59 Hawaii,60 Illinois,61 Pennsylvania,62 New York,63 
 
 59 Connecticut adopted the two-prong test for defect in several lengthy 
opinions.  See Izzarelli v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 136 A.3d 1232, 1235 (Conn. 
2016); Bifolck v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 152 A.3d 1183, 1188–89 (Conn. 2016); 
Potter v. Chi. Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319, 1326 (Conn. 1997).  In each of 
the cases, the plaintiff alleged defective design, and in each the plaintiff 
introduced evidence of a RAD.  The author found no case since 1997 in which 
the plaintiff did not introduce a RAD.  The consumer expectation test has been 
limited in that “the product must fail to meet legitimate, commonly held, 
minimum safety expectations . . . .”  Bifolck, 152 A.3d. at 1203. 
 60 Several Hawaii cases embrace the two-prong test for design defect: (1) 
consumer expectations and (2) risk-utility.  In each case the plaintiff offered a 
RAD.  See, e.g., Acoba v. Gen. Tire, Inc., 986 P.2d 288, 304 (Haw. 1999) (RAD 
offered); Ontai v. Straub Clinic & Hosp., Inc. 659 P.2d 734, 742 (Haw. 1983) (RAD 
offered); Brown v. Clark Equip. Co., 618 P.2d 267, 272 (Haw. 1980) (RAD offered); 
Wagatsuma v. Patch, 879 P.2d 572, 580 (Haw. Ct. App. 1994) (RAD offered).  No 
design case was found in Hawaii in which the plaintiff did not offer a RAD. 
 61 The leading case on design defect in Illinois is Mikolajczyk v. Ford Motor 
Co., 901 N.E.2d 329 (Ill. 2008).  In that case the plaintiff sought to proceed solely 
on the consumer expectation test.  Id. at 348.  The defendant wanted the court 
to apply risk-utility balancing.  Id.  The question for the court was whether the 
consumer expectation test “trumped” risk-utility. Id. at 352.  The court said: 
Although we have declined to adopt section 2 of the Products 
Liability Restatement as a statement of substantive law, we do find 
its formulation of the risk-utility test to be instructive. Under 
section 2(b), the risk-utility balance is to be determined based on 
consideration of a “broad range of factors,” including . . . the 
nature and strength of consumer expectations regarding the 
product, including expectations arising from product portrayal and 
marketing,” as well as “the likely effects of the alternative design 
on production costs; the effects of the alternative design on 
product longevity, maintenance, repair and esthetics; and the 
range of consumer choice among products” . . . . We adopt this 
formulation of the risk-utility test and hold that when the evidence 
presented by either or both parties supports the application of this 
integrated test, an appropriate instruction is to be given at the 
request of either party. If, however, both parties’ theories of the 
case are framed entirely in terms of consumer expectations, 
including those based on advertising and marketing messages, 
and/or whether the product was being put to a reasonably 
foreseeable use at the time of the injury, the jury should be 
instructed only on the consumer-expectation test.  
Adoption of this integrated test resolves the question of whether 
the answer to the risk-utility test “trumps” the answer to the 
consumer-expectation test because the latter is incorporated into 
the former and is but one factor among many for the jury to 
consider. 
Id. (citations omitted).  For a full analysis of Mikolajczyk, see Twerski & 
Henderson, Jr., The Triumph of Risk-Utility, supra note 13, at 1073–1077.  The 
practical effect of that decision is that if the plaintiff seeks to proceed under the 
consumer expectation test, the defendant can introduce risk-utility evidence and 
the jury will be given the integrated instruction.  The defendant will invariably 
argue that the product under consideration meets the risk-utility standard.  The 
only way for the plaintiff to rebut is to introduce a reasonable alternative design 
to demonstrate that the defendant’s claim is not valid.  It is no surprise that post-
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Mikolajczyk there is no design case in which the plaintiff did not introduce a RAD.  
Pre-Mikolajczyk, the Illinois courts applied the consumer expectation test.  There 
also appear to be some cases where the courts applied both consumer expectation 
and risk-utility analysis tests.  See Calles v. Scripto-Tokai Corp., 864 N.E.2d 249, 
256 (Ill. 2007) (“[T]his court has continued to employ these two tests [consumer 
expectation and risk-utility] when determining whether a product is 
unreasonably dangerous.”) (citing Blue v. Envtl. Eng’g, Inc., 828 N.E.2d 1128 (Ill. 
2005); Hansen v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 764 N.E.2d 35 (2002) (“separately  
analyzing whether an IV catheter connector was unreasonably dangerous   under 
the consumer-expectation and risk-utility tests”); see also Lamkin v. Towner, 563 
N.E.2d 449, 457 (Ill. 1990) (“A plaintiff may demonstrate that a product is 
defective in design . . . in one of two ways: (1) by introducing evidence that the 
product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when 
used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner or (2) by introducing 
evidence that the product’s design proximately caused his injury and the 
defendant fails to prove that on balance the benefits of the challenged design 
outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such designs.”); Dunham v. Vaughan & 
Bushnell Mfg., 247 N.E.2d 401, 403 (Ill. 1969) (considering both consumer 
expectation and risk-utility analysis).  Nonetheless, in the overwhelming majority 
of cases, plaintiffs introduced a RAD.  See, e.g., Rios v. Navistar Int’l Transp. 
Corp., 558 N.E.2d 252, 256 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (RAD offered); Cornstubble v. Ford 
Motor Co., 532 N.E.2d 884, 888 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (RAD offered); Hayes v. Kay 
Chem. Co., 482 N.E.2d 611, 614 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (RAD offered). 
 62  Tincher v. Omega Flex, Inc., 104 A.3d 328, 335 (Pa. 2016), is the seminal 
Pennsylvania case adopting the two-prong test for defect.  Tincher overruled the 
much-maligned Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co. case.  See Azzarello v. Black Bros. 
Co., 391 A.2d 1020 (Pa. 1978), overruled by Tincher, 104 A.3d.  Tincher, on its 
facts, alleged a design defect.  104 A.3d at 339.  It is not clear from the decision 
whether the plaintiff on remand would be able to make out a case under the 
consumer expectations test.  At trial both parties put in extensive evidence on 
risk-utility tradeoffs and the plaintiff clearly proffered a reasonable alternative 
design.  Id. at 338.  An examination of state cases citing Tincher reveals that in 
all classic design defect cases the plaintiff introduced a RAD.  See, e.g., Dunlap 
v. Fed. Signal Corp., 194 A.3d 1067, 1068, 1071 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2018) (RAD 
offered); Am. Honda Motor Co. v. Martinez, 2017 WL 1400968 at *2, *8 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 2017) (RAD offered); Webb v. Volvo Cars of N. Am., L.L.C., 148 A.3d 473, 476 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2016) (RAD offered).  The author could not find a design case in 
which a RAD was not introduced.  The only case in which a RAD was not 
introduced, High v. Pennsy Supply, Inc., 154 A.3d. 341, 351 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2017), is probably not a design case.  In that case, plaintiffs were injured when 
exposed parts of their bodies came into contact with wet caustic cement and 
sought to recover under the consumer expectation test.  The court noted that the 
design claim (defective cement) appeared to be a failure to warn claim. 
 63 The premier case on design defect liability in New York is Voss v. Black & 
Decker Mfg. Co., 450 N.E.2d 204, 205 (N.Y. 1983).  In a lengthy opinion, the court 
set out multiple factors to be taken into account in making a risk-utility 
assessment in an action based on strict liability in tort.  In Denny v. Ford Motor 
Co., 662 N.E.2d 730, 733 (N.Y. 1995), the Court of Appeals held that in an action 
based on breach of the implied warranty of merchantability (U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(c)), 
a plaintiff could establish a case for design defect if the product fails to meet “the 
expectations for the performance of the product when used in the customary, 
usual and reasonably foreseeable manners.”  Id at 736 (footnote omitted).  In an 
article by Paul D. Rheingold & Scott D. Kagan, How to Prove the Defect in a New 
York Product Liability Case, BILL OF PARTICULARS, no. 1, 2014, at 37, the authors 
declare that the “most significant hurdle for a plaintiff seeking to prove defect in 
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the design of a product is the requirement that under New York law, the plaintiff 
must demonstrate a reasonable alternative design [RAD]”.  Failure to do so will 
result in summary judgment for the defendant.  See, e.g., Preston v. Peter Luger 
Enters., Inc., 858 N.Y.S.2d 828, 832 (App. Div. 2008) (affirming summary 
judgment for the Defendant because the Plaintiff failed to produce a RAD); 
Rypkema v. Time Mfg. Co, 263 F.Supp.2d 687, 695 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (granting 
motion to dismiss for failure to produce a RAD); Stalker v. Goodyear Tire & 
Rubber Co., 874 N.Y.S.2d 632, 635 (App. Div. 2009) (noting failure to produce a 
RAD); Sabater ex rel. Santana v. Lead Indus. Ass’n., 704 N.Y.S.2d 800, 805 (Sup. 
Ct. 2000) (granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss the negligent product 
design claims); Colon ex rel. Molina v. BIC USA, Inc., 199 F.Supp.2d 53, 84, 88–
90 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (reviewing the authority on the necessity of a RAD); see also 
Twerski & Henderson, Jr., The Triumph of Risk-Utility, supra note 13, at 1093 
n.139 (“A substantial number of decisions set forth the requirement of a 
reasonable alternative design as a prerequisite for a prima facie case of defective 
design.”); Michael Hoenig, The Law of Manufacturing and Design Defect Liability, 
in 1 NEW YORK STATE BAR ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY 1 (Goldberg & Freedenberg eds., 
2019); NEW YORK PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTION § 2:200 (2018 ed.). 
Several years later, in an article entitled An Overlooked Weapon in Product 
Liability Lawsuits, 90 N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N J. 21 (May 2018), Rheingold laments the 
fact that the plaintiff’s bar has not made use of the consumer expectations test 
in design defect cases and cites several cases where New York courts have found 
a design defect based on failed consumer expectations.  The first is Bradley v. 
Earl B. Feiden, Inc., where the New York Court of Appeals held that it is sufficient 
that a defect in a new refrigerator caused a fire and there is no need to specify 
the defect.  864 N.E.2d 600, 602 (N.Y. 2007).  That case is almost identical to 
Speller ex rel. Miller v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 790 N.E.2d 252, 255 (N.Y. 2003) 
(cited by the court in Bradley) where the court relied on RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 3.  One can draw a circumstantial inference of defect (res 
ipsa) where a product fails to perform its manifestly intended function without 
proof of specific defect.  Miller, 790 N.E.2d at 254–55.  In any event, that case 
does not speak to design defect since the court says that the case involves a 
manufacturing defect.  The second, Duval v. Delta Int’l Mach. Corp., No. 1:13-
CV-4270-6H 2015 WL 4522911, at *3, *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2015), is a design 
defect case in which the plaintiff pled both strict liability and breach of the implied 
warranty of merchantability.  The plaintiff introduced credible evidence of a RAD 
and the court denied summary judgment on both causes of action, holding that 
under the consumer expectation test a RAD was not necessary.  Id. at *3–4.  The 
third, Wojcik v. Empire Forklift, Inc., 783 N.Y.S.2d 698 (App. Div. 2004), the court 
held that even absent a RAD a court could find that a product was defectively 
designed because it failed to meet consumer expectations as to its safety.  Id. at 
700.  After reviewing every reported state design defect case in the twenty-three 
years post-Denny in which the plaintiff alleged strict tort liability and/or the 
implied warranty of merchantability, only in Wojcik was a RAD not introduced. 
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Oregon,64 Tennessee,65 Washington,66 California67 and 
 
 64 OR. REV. STAT. §30.920 (2007) adopts section 402A, including comments 
a through m, as the law governing products liability in Oregon.  In McCathern v. 
Toyota Motor Corp., 23 P.3d 320, 329–30 (Or. 2001), the Oregon Supreme Court 
said that it was bound by the legislative determination set forth in section 402A, 
comment I (consumer expectations test).  The court then said: 
Plaintiff acknowledges that evidence related to risk-utility 
balancing of that kind may be necessary to show that a product 
failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would have 
expected. However, plaintiff disputes the Court of Appeals’ holding 
that, under the consumer expectations test, a plaintiff must 
introduce such evidence. See McCathern, 985 P.2d at 811 (proof of 
safer practicable alternative design essential to consumer risk-
utility theory). According to plaintiff, evidence related to risk-utility 
balancing, as described above, is required only under the now-
defunct reasonable manufacturer test. See Wilson v. Piper Aircraft 
Corp., 577 P.2d 1322[, 1326–27] (Or. 1978) (relying on Phillip’s 
reasonable manufacturer test; requiring that, when risk-utility 
balancing and proof of design alternative are necessary, proof 
must include evidence that alternative design was practicable). 
We agree that evidence related to risk-utility balancing, which may 
include proof that a practicable and feasible design alternative was 
available, will not always be necessary to prove that a product’s 
design is defective and unreasonably dangerous, i.e., that the 
product failed to meet ordinary consumer expectations. However, 
because the parties did not dispute that evidence related to risk-
utility balancing was necessary in this case, we leave for another 
day the question under what circumstances ORS 30.920 requires 
a plaintiff to support a product liability design-defect claim with 
evidence related to risk-utility balancing of the kind discussed 
above. 
McCathern, 23 P.3d at 331–32 (footnotes omitted).   
In McCathern and in all subsequent design cases in Oregon, the plaintiffs 
introduced a RAD.  See Benjamin v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 61 P.3d 257, 268 (Or. 
Ct. App. 2002).  No design case was found in which a RAD was not introduced 
by the plaintiff into evidence.  For a discussion of McCathern, see James A. 
Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Product Design Liability in Oregon and the 
New Restatement, 78 OR. L. REV. 1 (1999); see also Purdy v. Deere & Co., 386 
P.3d 2, 8 (Or. Ct. App. 2016). 
 65 Tennessee adopted a two-pronged test for defective design in Ray ex rel. 
Holman v. BIC Corp., 925 S.W.2d 527, 528 (Tenn. 1996).  The two tests are (1) 
the consumer expectation test and (2) the prudent manufacturer test.  Id. at 530–
31.  The prudent manufacturer test requires risk-utility balancing.  Id. at 531–
32.  In reviewing all the Tennessee appellate decisions (both in the Intermediate 
and Supreme Court), we found none in which the consumer expectation test 
played a decisive role.  In other words, all the cases that relied on the consumer 
expectation test were classic res ipsa cases that would have been decided the 
same way under Section 3 of the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB.  See Jackson 
v. Gen. Motors Corp., 60 S.W.3d 800, 802–03 (Tenn. 2001) (resolving a classic 
res ipsa case of seatbelt breaking when auto collided at a speed of 19–23 mph 
with a tree).  If the case did not warrant a Section 3 inference of defect, the plaintiff 
was required to present a reasonable alternative design.  See, e.g., Brown v. 
Crown Equip. Corp., 181 S.W.3d 268, 276 (Tenn. 2005) (RAD proffered for stand-
up forklift without escape door and issue of unreasonable danger for the jury); 
Shoemake v. Omniquip Int’l, Inc., 152 S.W.3d 567, 573 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) 
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Florida.68  Prior to 2005, Ohio was in this camp.69  Here, too, 
 
(where the plaintiff used forklift capable of lifting 10,000 pounds as a lift for 
himself and claimed that the lift was defective in design because it did not have 
a personnel-lift attachment, court made mention of and then ignored the 
consumer expectation test and found that the plaintiff did not provide sufficient 
evidence of a reasonable alternative design and granted summary judgement to 
the defendant). 
 66 By statute Washington provides for liability for defective design if there 
was a reasonable alternative design, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.72.030(a) (West 
1998), or if the product failed consumer expectations, § 7.72.030(c)(3) (implied 
warranty).  Almost all the Washington cases cite to the two-pronged test for 
defect.  See, e.g., O’Connell v. MacNeil Wash Sys. Ltd., 409 P.3d 1107, 1114 
(Wash. Ct. App.  2017) (“In order to show that a product was unreasonably safe 
because of its design or lack of warnings, a plaintiff may rely on the risk-utility 
test . . . or the consumer expectations test.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); 
Thongchoom v. Graco Children Prods. Inc., 71 P.3d 214, 217 (Wash. Ct. App. 
2003) (“Two alternative tests may be used to establish that a product was not 
reasonably safe as designed: the risk-utility test and the consumer expectations 
test.”); Bruns v. PACCAR, Inc., 890 P.2d 469, 474 (Wash Ct. App. 1995) (“A 
plaintiff may demonstrate [design defect] by using either a risk-utility analysis or 
a consumer expectation standard.”).  For the most part in design cases, plaintiffs 
offer a RAD.  See O’Connell, 409 P.3d at 1115; Soproni v. Polygon Apartment 
Partners, 971 P.2d 500, 503, 506 (Wash. 1999) (en banc); Lenhardt v. Ford Motor 
Co., 683 P.2d 1097, 1098 (Wash. 1984) (en banc); Anderson v. Dries & Krump 
Mfg., 739 P.2d 1177, 1183 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987); Lamon v. McDonnell Douglas 
Corp., 576 P.2d 426, 428 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978).  The few cases that allege defect 
design and do not set forth a RAD are cases that would be covered under the 
PROD. LIAB. RESTATEMENT § 3, cmt. b.  See, e.g., Pagnotta v. Beall Trailers of Or., 
Inc., 991 P.2d 728, 734 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (“[W]e conclude the consumer 
expectation rule applies here to avoid summary judgment as expert testimony of 
the exact defect is not required as a matter of law.”); Bruns, 890 P.2d at 476 
(“When it is shown that a product failed to meet the reasonable expectations of 
the user the inference is that there was some sort of defect, a precise definition 
of which is unnecessary.”).  The comment specifically provides that one may draw 
an inference of defect in a design defect case if the product fails to perform its 
manifestly intended function.  Both of the cited cases fall into that category.  See 
also Higgins v. Intex Recreation Corp., 99 P.3d 421, 424 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004) 
(finding that snow tube that propels user backward down a snow-covered hill at 
30 mph has low social utility and high risk of serious injury).  This product would 
be covered under PROD. LIAB. RESTATEMENT § 3, cmt. e (product with low social 
utility and high risk may be defective without proof of a RAD). 
 67 See Soule v. Gen. Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 305 (Cal. 1994); Barker v. 
Lull Eng’g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 446 (Cal. 1978); discussion infra at note 71 to 83. 
 68 See Aubin v. Union Carbride Corp., 177 So. 3d 489, 512 (Fla. 2015).  It 
should be noted that in the overwhelming majority of Florida cases the plaintiff 
proffered a RAD.  See, e.g., Sta-Rite Indus., v. Levey, 909 So. 2d 901, 908 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (RAD offered); Gen. Motors Corp. v. McGee, 837 So. 2d 1010, 
1017 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (RAD offered); Brown v. Glade & Grove Supply, 
Inc., 647 So. 2d 1033, 1035 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (RAD offered); Hyundai 
Motor Co. (Korea) v. Phillip, 639 So. 2d 1064, 1065 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) 
(RAD offered); Stazenski v. Tennant Co., 617 So. 2d 344, 345 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1993) (RAD offered); LeMaster v. Glock, Inc., 610 So. 2d 1336, 1337 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1992) (RAD offered). 
 69 Liability for defective design is governed by OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
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almost without exception, plaintiffs introduced a RAD in every 
reported state case.  California allows the plaintiff the two-
prong test option.70  However, if the plaintiff proceeded under 
the consumer expectation test alone, the defendant cannot 
introduce risk-utility evidence to rebut the plaintiff’s claim that 
the product disappointed consumer expectations.71 
V 
THE EXCEPTIONAL CASES–CONSUMER EXPECTATIONS WITH NO 
RAD 
In two states, California and Florida, there are indeed 
several cases where plaintiffs did not introduce a RAD where 
there was an allegation of design defect.  Many of these cases 
involved asbestos.72  It does not require extensive citation to 
 
2307.75(F) (West 2005) that became effective in 2005. It provides: 
A product is not defective in design or formulation if, at the time 
the product left the control of its manufacturer, a practical and 
technically feasible alternative design or formulation was not 
available that would have prevented the harm for which the 
claimant seeks to recover compensatory damages without 
substantially impairing the usefulness or intended purpose of the 
product. 
Whether a product is defective in design is to be determined by a risk-benefit test 
set forth in § 2307.75(A)–(C). 
A prior version of the statute, § 2307.75(A)(2), allowed a plaintiff to recover if 
the product design did not meet consumer expectations.  See Civil Procedure–
Tort Reform Act, 2001 Ohio Laws File 26, § 2307.75(A)(2) (2001).  Under the 
revised version of the statute consumer expectations is one of many 
considerations to be taken into account in undertaking a risk-benefit analysis. 
See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.75(B)(5).  Thus, there is no longer a stand-alone 
consumer expectation test for design defect.  Even under the previous statute, 
the author could not find a design case where the plaintiff did not put into 
evidence a RAD.  See, e.g., Leichtamer v. Am. Motors Corp., 424 N.E.2d 568, 572 
(Ohio 1981) (RAD offered); Zigler v. Avco Corp., 846 N.E.2d 547, 554 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 2005) (RAD offered). 
 70 See supra note 67. 
 71 See infra notes 72−84. 
 72 See Baeza v. Special Elec. Co., B264220 2016 WL 7387226, at *1 (Cal. Ct. 
App. Dec. 21, 2016); Saller v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d 151, 157 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2010); Garza v. Asbestos Corp., 74 Cal. Rptr. 3d 359, 360–61 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2008); Cunningham v. Buffalo Pumps, Inc., 2008 WL 4966519, at *1 
(Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 24, 2008); Jones v. John Crane, Inc., 35 Cal. Rptr. 3d 144, 
148 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005); Arena v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 74 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 580, 584 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998); Morton v. Owen-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 40 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 22, 22–23 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995); Sparks v. Owens-Ill., Inc., 38 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 739, 739 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).  It is interesting to note that Florida 
adopted the consumer expectation test in an asbestos case.  See Aubin, 177 So. 
3d at 510.  The Aubin court acknowledged that under the PROD. LIAB. 
RESTATEMENT § 2, cmt. e, a RAD is not required if a product is “manifestly 
unreasonable” in that “the extremely high degree of danger posed by its use . . . 
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make the point that asbestos is not just another products 
liability case.  Courts have held manufacturers of asbestos to 
a standard that is sui generis.73 
California appears to differ from almost all jurisdictions in 
one significant manner.  They have taken the position that a 
plaintiff, by basing her claim entirely on consumer 
expectations, can prevent the defendant from introducing risk-
utility evidence to show the jury that its product is, in fact, 
safer than any other alternative.  The source for this view stems 
from Soule v. General Motors Corp.,74 a case that sets forth the 
parameters of the two-prong test for defect in California.  The 
court said that if a plaintiff is successful in establishing that a 
product failed the consumer expectation test, “[t]he 
manufacturer may not defend a claim that a product’s design 
failed to perform as safely as its ordinary consumers would 
expect by presenting expert evidence of the design’s relative 
risks and benefits.”75  In a telling footnote to the above 
statement, the court said: 
For example, the ordinary consumers of modern 
automobiles may and do expect that such vehicles will be 
designed so as not to explode while idling at stoplights, 
experience sudden steering or brake failure as they leave 
the dealership, or roll over and catch fire in two-mile-per-
hour collisions. If the plaintiff in a product liability action 
proved that a vehicle’s design produced such a result, the 
 
so substantially outweighs its negligible social utility that no rational, reasonable 
person, fully aware of the relevant facts, would choose to use . . . the product.” 
Thus, rejection of RAD in asbestos cases is quite understandable. 
 73 For example, New Jersey held asbestos manufactures liable for risks that 
were scientifically unknowable at the time the defendant distributed this product 
in Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 548 (N.J. 1982).  The 
court retreated from that position in Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 374, 388 
(N.J. 1984), holding that its decision in Beshada was limited to asbestos only.  
Similarly, the economic loss rule which has been widely adopted throughout the 
country does not apply to asbestos cases.  See PROD. LIAB. RESTATEMENT § 21, 
cmt. e.  The author does not seek to imply that in California and Florida the 
consumer expectation test is limited to asbestos cases. However, in the more 
classic design cases, plaintiffs have regularly offered a RAD in evidence.  See, e.g., 
Pannu v. Land Rover N. Am., Inc., 120 Cal. Rptr. 3d 605, 612–13 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2011) (offering a reinforced roof structure as a RAD in an SUV design case); 
Gordon v. Nissan Motor Co., 88 Cal. Rptr. 3d 778, 787 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (RAD 
offered).  Similarly, in most Florida design cases plaintiffs have introduced a RAD.  
See supra note 68. 
 74 Soule v. Gen. Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 308–09 (Cal. 1994).  The two-
prong test for design defect was originally propounded in Barker v. Lull Eng’g Co., 
573 P.2d 443, 455–56 (Cal. 1978). 
 75 Soule, 882 P.2d at 308. 
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jury could find forthwith that the car failed to perform as 
safely as its ordinary consumers would expect, and was 
therefore defective.76 
Since Soule, the California courts have struggled with the 
question as to what facts support legitimate consumer 
expectations as to product performance.77 
A recent case demonstrates the problem.  In Romine v. 
Johnson Controls, Inc.,78 an injured driver brought suit against 
Nissan when, as a result of the force of collision with her car, 
the seat back collapsed causing her head to strike the vehicle’s 
back seat rendering her a quadriplegic.  The collision causing 
the plaintiff’s injury was only one of a series of chain collisions 
brought about when a third-party driver slammed at high 
speed into a car stopped in traffic on a freeway exit ramp.  In 
affirming a jury verdict for the plaintiff, the court said that 
“[c]onsumers have expectations about whether a vehicle’s 
driver’s seat will collapse rearward in a rear-end collision, 
regardless of the speed of the collision.”79  The defendant argued 
unsuccessfully that the consumer expectations test was 
inappropriate for such a violent collision since there are no 
expectations as to how a seat will perform in such a violent 
crash.80  The defendant also sought to introduce risk-utility 
evidence to show that any alternative seat would be less safe 
and the seat as designed provided the optimum level of safety.81  
The court, relying on Soule, denied them the opportunity to do 
so.  The bottom line from that holding is that consumers have 
a right to expect that an automobile manufacturer would 
produce a car that in actuality provides less danger and greater 
safety than the car that is the subject of litigation.82  Most 
 
 76 Id. at 305 n.3. 
 77 See, e.g., Bresnahan v. Chrysler Corp., 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 446, 451 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1995) (holding that the consumer expectations test applies when an airbag 
inflated in a low speed collision forcing the plaintiff’s arm to strike the windshield; 
the defendant, auto manufacturer cannot defend risk-utility grounds); Pruitt v. 
Gen. Motors Corp., 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 4, 6 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (finding consumer 
expectations test does not apply on facts similar to Bresnahan). 
 78 Romine v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 169 Cal. Rptr. 3d 208, 213 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2014). 
 79 Id. at 219–20 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. at 220. 
 82 The author was consulted by the defendant in a similar California case 
dealing with the ability of a seat to withstand a high-speed collision.  Gueffroy v. 
Audi AG, No. 34-2013-00146684 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct.) (dismissed August 
15, 2016).  It is worth noting that the defendants sought to introduce a poll 
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courts that embrace the consumer expectations test disagree 
and will allow a defendant to introduce risk-utility evidence as 
relevant to consumer expectations.83 
In short, except for California, whether a RAD is required 
or not, the reality is that the availability of a RAD will become 
the crucial determinant for prosecuting a successful design 
defect case.  In the overwhelming majority of cases, plaintiffs 
will make the RAD the central focus of their cases.  And even 
if they don’t, defendants will introduce the lack of availability 
of a RAD in defense to the consumer expectation claim of the 
plaintiff.84 
 
undertaken by Daniel M. Oppenheimer of UCLA seeking to determine whether 
consumers actually have expectations about seat performance in a 50-mph 
collision.  The study concluded consumers do not appear to have true beliefs or 
expectations about how a car seat will behave in such a high-speed collision.  A 
copy of the study is available from the author of this article.  The California trial 
court did not rule on the admissibility of the study since the case was settled.  
See Notice of Conditional Settlement, Gueffroy, No. 34-2013-00146684, ROA No. 
354. 
 83 See, e.g., Aubin v. Union Carbide, Corp., 177 So. 3d 489, 511 (Fla. 2015). 
While we conclude that the Third Restatement’s risk utility test 
and establishment of a reasonable alternative design mandate are 
not requirements for finding strict liability, we note that nothing 
precludes the plaintiff in proving his or her case from showing that 
alternative safer designs exist—or for that matter precludes the 
defendant from showing that it could not have made the product 
any safer through reasonable alternative designs. 
Id. (emphasis added);  
The consumer expectations test is that standard in Kansas for 
determining whether a design defect exists. However, we also 
recognize the validity of risk/utility analysis as a guide in 
determining the expectations of consumers in complex cases. In 
Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., [694 A.2d 1319 (Conn. 
1997)], the Connecticut Supreme Court upheld the consumer 
expectations test but authorized the incorporation of risk utility 
factors to help the jury in its determination of what an ordinary 
consumer would reasonably expect. [694 A.2d at 1333–34]. The 
Potter court quoted the Supreme Court of Washington in Seattle-
First Nat’l Bank v. Tabert, 542 P.2d 774, 779 (Wash. 1975): “In 
determining the reasonable expectations of the ordinary 
consumer, a number of factors must be considered. The relative 
cost of the product, the gravity of the potential harm from the 
claimed defect and the cost and feasibility of eliminating or 
minimizing the risk may be relevant in a particular case. In other 
instances the nature of the product or the nature of the claimed 
defect may make other factors relevant to the issue. 
Delaney v. Deere & Co., 999 P.2d 930, 944 (Kan. 2000); see also Mikolajczyk v. 
Ford Motor Co., 901 N.E.2d 329, 352–53 (Ill. 2008) (holding that when risk-utility 
evidence is introduced by either party the jury should be instructed on risk-
utility, which includes consumer expectations as one factor). 
 84 It is worth noting that four decades ago Dean Page Keeton addressed this 
issue.  He said: 
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A decade ago, on the tenth anniversary of the Products 
Liability Restatement, Professor Henderson and the author 
wrote an article heralding “The Triumph of Risk Utility.”  The 
author stands behind their research that a majority of states 
demand a RAD as a requirement to make out a prima facie 
case of design defect.  Now, one decade later, one can say with 
confidence that whether courts demand a RAD or not is of 
minor importance, for whatever theory a court adopts the case 
will be decided on whether there was a reasonable alternative 
design available. 
 
 
It is quite clear that to the extent that a maker knows, or in the 
exercise of ordinary care should know, of a risk or hazard that 
users may not discover or appreciate, liability results for breach of 
the duty to disclose what a reasonable person would disclose. This 
ground of liability protects users and consumers to a considerable 
extent from harm resulting from unappreciated dangers. It is 
submitted, however, that an inquiry as to whether the danger in 
fact of the design outweighed the benefits of the design would 
better protect users and consumers, without placing an undue 
burden on manufacturers and suppliers. The court’s primary 
justification for the retention of the contemplation test is the ease 
with which the plaintiff can establish a design defect under this 
test by circumstantial evidence. If a claimant proves that a product 
fails under circumstances the ordinary purchaser or user would 
not have expected, a case has been made. That is clearly so, but 
the question is, should it be so? I think not. If the court would 
permit the defendant to show under a risk-utility analysis by way 
of rebuttal that it would not be feasible, then the position would be 
supportable. 
W. Page Keeton, supra note 16, at 310 (footnotes omitted). 
